InvestmentRulesandDenialofChange
GusVanHarten * The rules regime established by investment treaties is complex and opaque. Yet it has generatedcontroversyacrosscountriesandcontinents.Peoplehaveprotestedandsometimes died, not only to resist harm they foresee to their lives and communities from foreign investment but also to respond to the arcane processes of investment treaties themselves. Manylocalorganizationshavefocusedtheirsightsoninvestmentarbitrationbecauseofitsrole as a key forum in which decisions of great importance to their constituencies are made. Arbitration has supplanted other decision makers in matters of high public policy and has, in turn, found itself mired in the politics of conflicts involving communities, governments, and internationalbusiness.Thepoliticsofthisenvironmentfordecisionmaking,inturn,appearto be deeply mistrusted, even derided, by many arbitrators and advocates of investment arbitration. David Schneiderman's Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization draws on constitutional theory to survey this field of controversy. Schneiderman's orientation emphasizes both the political importance and the practical benefits of democratic pluralism. The book is rich in its study of the relationships between international investment rules and the constitutional principlesofliberaldemocracy.Acentralthemeisthatthosewhomanagetheinvestment-rules system, especially the arbitrators and their surrounding 'band of elites' (160), have taken investmenttreatieswellbeyondconventionalnotionsoflimitedgovernmentintheinterestsof aratherstark,neo-liberalvisionofsocietyandmarkets.Schneidermanexploreshowtheneoliberal program, in turn, has re-entered the domestic sphere through the real or imagined power of investment law. Although the impact of this re-entry may not be determinative of policydecisionsinthewidercontextofdomesticpolitics,Schneidermanarguesthatinvestment treaties have, nonetheless, removed important options for pluralist self-government. He expresses a highly aspirational yet constructive aim: 'Rather than instituting a transnational system for uniform economic governance, any transnational regime should encourage innovation,experimentation,andthecapacitytoimaginealternativefuturesformanagingthe relationshipbetweenpoliticsandmarkets '(8) . The potency of the investment-rules regime compared to other international adjudicative systems stems from the ability of investors (usually transnational firms) to sue governments and from the corresponding power of arbitrators to award investors public compensation for the negative consequences of regulatory activity. Investor claims are decided by tripartite arbitration tribunals, one member of which is appointed by the investor, another by the respondentstate,andthethird,apresidingarbitrator,byagreementoftheparties(orpartyappointedarbitrators)orbyadefaultappointingauthoritysuchasthepresidentoftheWorld Bank. Arbitrators adjudicate claims based on broad standards that regulate states by prohibiting'expropriation'or'deprivation'ofinvestorassets,byprescribing'fairandequitable treatment'or'fullprotectionandsecurity'forinvestors,andbyobligating'nolessfavourable' statetreatmentofforeignbusinessrelativetoitsdomesticcounterparts.Ifatribunalinterprets andappliesthesestandardssoastofindabreachofthetreaty,itmayorderthestatetopay damages to the investor. The award can then be enforced against the state's assets in other countries, although states have generally paid awards without obliging investors to pursue enforcementabroad. Muchofthismaysoundbenignfromadomesticviewpoint,especiallyonethatchampionsthe roleofcourtsinprotectingindividualsfromthestate,untiloneconsidersthesheernoveltyof the investment-law regime, its openness to investors and not to others whose interests are affectedbyforeigninvestmentanditsregulation,andtheanomalousdelegationtoarbitrators (ratherthanjudges)ofthepowertodisciplinelegislatures,courts,andadministrationswithout seriousoversightbyadomesticorinternationalcourt.Thesenovelinstitutionalfeaturesofthe systemarenotthethrustofSchneiderman'scritique,however.Hefocusesnotoninvestment arbitration as a system of adjudication but rather on the rules regime as a system of government and, in particular, on its suppression of previously available avenues for democraticchoiceandregulatoryadaptation. Schneiderman begins by examining the legal and ideological underpinnings of international investment rules. He studies how key concepts under the treaties, especially the concept of expropriation, originate in domestic constitutions, especially that of the United States. In elaboratingonthis,Schneidermanprovidesanexcellentsurveyinchapter2ofUScaselawon the Fifth Amendment safeguards against takings of property. For instance, he connects expansive readings of 'indirect expropriation' by investment tribunals to US Supreme Court Justice Scalia's move toward the 'sole effect' doctrine in US takings law and away from the predominant alternative 'that considers public interest objectives under the rubric of proportionality analysis' (72). The discussion here is thorough and elucidating. I found that it assistedmetobreakdownclearlythedoctrinalfaultlinesthathaveopenedamonginvestmenttreatyawardsontheissueofindirectexpropriation. Schneiderman'sreviewofcaselawfocusesontheUnitedStatesmainlybecausehisreviewof investment awards focuses on those involving the three NAFTA states and, more broadly, on the implications of NAFTA for Mexico and Canada. On the other hand, Schneiderman shows how other constitutions -such as those of Dicey's Great Britain, Weimar Germany, and twentieth-century Latin American states -adopted different orientations to property rights, inspired,forinstance,byLéonDuguit'sviewofthestateandpropertyasinstitutionsjustifiedby the social function they perform (cited at 165). Schneiderman also makes clear that the investment-rules regime is not simply inspired by US notions of takings but has served as a vehicleforratchetingupthedisciplinaryimpactsofinternationalreviewandthecorresponding protectionsandprivilegesenjoyedbyinternationalbusiness. A richly informative feature of the book is its review in chapters 3 and 4 of case studies examiningtheimpactofinvestmentrulesongovernments.Schneidermanpursuestwoangles. Thefirstisareviewofcasesinvolvingapparent'regulatorychill';thatis,apparentdeterrenceof regulationinthefaceofinvestorclaimsorthreatenedclaims.Thesecondisananalysisofhow publicinitiativesmaycontravenetheinvestmentrules.Onthefirst,Schneidermanrecallsthe theme of US constitutionalism by tracing the language of regulatory chill to US free speech doctrine(70),althoughthespreadofthisterminologymightsimplybeafactorofinvestment arbitrationunderNAFTAdrawingpublicattentionatanearlierstagethanhasarbitrationunder otherinvestmenttreaties.Hecautionsthatreliableconclusionsaboutregulatorychillcallfor'a detailedinvestigationintotheworkingsandpracticesofoneormoreoftheNAFTAnationalor sub-national governments in order to determine whether there has been regulatory chill in certainbranchesofgovernment'(70).AlthoughSchneidermandoesnotaspiretothislevelof empiricalscrutiny,heestablishesapowerfulpreliminarycaseinhisdiscussionoftheimpactof NAFTA threats or claims on Canadian efforts to require plain packaging of cigarettes (120-9) andtobanagasolineadditiveonprecautionarygrounds(129-34),bothforwell-foundedpublic health reasons. He reviews also, though less extensively, the abandoning of a provincial proposalforpublicautoinsuranceinCanada(70-1).Thesecasestudiesaredealtwithatavery goodlevelofdetailandwithsharpattentiontocontext. Akeymessageofthebookisthattheimpactofinvestmenttreatiesongovernmentsdepends onthediscretionarychoicesofarbitrators.SchneidermanexaminesearlyNAFTAcasesinwhich tribunals opted for highly expansive approaches to various disciplines. His condemnation of Metalclad 1 ispowerful,focusingonthetribunal'sfailureeventomentionlocalconcernsabout dumping of hazardous waste in the relevant region of Mexico and its further strategy of interpreting away the authority of Mexican municipalities to refuse building permits for environmental reasons (82-6). Metalclad, and other early NAFTA awards, are critiqued extensivelytodemonstratehowtribunalshaveactivelyexacerbatedconcernsaboutregulatory chillwhilealsoexcitingprospectivefutureclaimantsandtheircounsel.Thatsaid,Schneiderman does not go further and examine the later wave of NAFTA cases, including, for instance, Loewen, 2 ADF, 3 and Methanex, 4 that adopt a moderated position in the balancing of investor interests against regulatory concerns. He also does not address the apparent irony that the numerousawardsthathavedismissedclaimsagainsttheUnitedStateshavetendedtoadopt much softer approaches to the investment rules than do other awards, even though the US constitutionissupposedtobe,forSchneiderman,theregime'sguidingstar. Inchapters5and6,Schneidermanreviewsanothersetofcasesstudies,fromSouthAfricaand Colombia for the most part, in order to examine conflicts between investment rules and domesticpolicychoicesinvolvinglandreformorsocialredistribution.Inchapter5,heprovides anoutstandingreviewofthepoliticalhistoryofblackeconomicempowerment(BEE)legislation in South Africa and its consequent triggering of an investor claim against South Africa. Schneiderman reviews how the legislation was originally approached by the South African government with great caution and concludes that 'broad-based BEE, in sum, is designed to offend,aslittleaspossible,foreigninvestorsandthelegalregimefortheirprotection.Itis,for the most part, a measured and modest attempt at reversing the apartheid-era project of economicinequality'(154).Evenso,twoItaliancompaniesbroughtatreatyclaimagainstSouth Africa to resist one of the few remaining teeth in the legislation, its requirements for divestmentintheminingsector.Schneidermanexaminesthisclaimbyacarefulassessmentof howthelanguageoftheBEElegislationappearstoviolateinvestmenttreaties,especiallytheir prohibitions on discrimination against foreign investors. It is a troubling account of the apparent collision between investor interests and social reform in circumstances where the redress of past injustice does not occur by great leaps forward but rather in baby steps. For Schneiderman,thecasestudyrevealshow'SouthAfrica'sinternalpolicyoptionswillhavebeen shapedbytheexternalenvironmentforthepromotionandprotectionofforeigninvestment' (157) . As to what this says about the pre-eminence of investor interests, Schneiderman concludesglumlythat'stateprojects,likebroad-basedBEE,likelywillserveasweakvehiclesfor economicredistributioninacountryrifewithinequality,whilenarrowingtheavailablerangeof preferred policy options' (157). Broadly, alongside his other case studies on land reform in South African and constitutional reform in Colombia, Schneiderman's research reveals how arbitratorsarecalledontomakegoverningchoicesinanadjudicativecontext. Throughout many of its chapters, the book identifies how arbitrators have interpreted investment treaties in ways that take constitutionalist notions of limited government beyond their domestic trajectories. With respect to US constitutionalism, in particular, Schneiderman opinesthattherulesregimeis'modeledon,thoughmoreexpansiveinitsprotectionsthan,the USconstitutionalexperience'(223).Theorientationoftribunals,saysSchneiderman,tracksthat ofsomeUSSupremeCourtjudges'whohaveindicatedawillingnesstoexpandthetakingsrule even beyond its conventional limits, centered around land, to the protection of wealth and futureprofitsuncoupledfromspecificpropertyrights'(53).Thepredominantideologyatwork here is that of governmental self-restraint and thus it offers a particular view of politics and democracy (9) Likewise,versionsofthe'ruleoflaw'-ahighlycontestedconceptinconstitutionalistdiscourse, needless to say -that win favour in investment-law circles have a distinctly neo-liberal bent (53). Indeed, the investment-rules regime emerges for Schneiderman as an 'institutional partner'ofneo-liberalism(2). Schneiderman references, for example, the Oscar Chinn decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice (73). In 1931, Belgium established a de facto monopoly in the Belgian Congo for its state-owned river transport company in order to allow it to survive a severe commercialdepression.Acompetingprivatecompany,ownedbyBritishnationalOscarChinn, was driven from business. The United Kingdom brought a claim against Belgium on Chinn's behalfbeforethePCIJ.Today,wewouldnodoubtdescribeMr.Chinnasaforeigninvestorand mightwellseethisclaimbroughtbyChinnorhiscompanybeforeaninvestmenttreatytribunal. Moreover,judgingbythereactionsofmostarbitratorstoArgentina'scurrencyreformsinthe faceofitsfinancialcrisisof2001,Mr.Chinnwouldlikelybeawardedsubstantialcompensation forthelossesarisingfromwhatcouldbecharacterizedashisindirectexpropriation,orperhaps hisdiscriminatoryandinequitabletreatment,atthehandsoftheBelgiancolonialauthorities. Most arbitrators would quickly reject as self-serving any response by Belgium (or Argentina) thattheforeigninvestor'spositionwascharacterizedbythepossessionofcustomersandthe possibility of making a profit … Favourable business conditions and goodwill are transient circumstances, subject to inevitable changes … no enterprise -least of all a commercial or transportenterprise,thesuccessofwhichisdependentonthefluctuatinglevelofpricesand rates-canescapefromthechancesandhazardsresultingfromgeneraleconomicconditions… theyareallexposedtothedangerofruinorextinctionifcircumstanceschange. YetthispassagecomesnotfromanArgentinebriefin2002butfromthePCIJ'sreasonsforits decision disposing of Chinn's claim in 1934. Clearly, the PCIJ adopted a flexible approach to state regulation in the face of economic uncertainty, one that contrasts abjectly with recent awardsagainstArgentina(99-101).AsSchneidermanargues,therehasbeena'decidedtilt'in the interpretation of international law to favour foreign investors, courtesy of investment arbitrators, in a departure from both domestic constitutionalism and customary international law. Thereareanumberofironiesinthis.Oneisthattheincorporationofananti-regulatoryreflex intoinvestmentlawisoutofplacewhenoneconsiderstheabsenceofanylegislativebranchin thesystem.Thereisnointernationalparliamentto'dialogue'withinvestmentarbitratorsina mannerakintothatofconstitutionalinteractionsbetweenCongressandtheSupremeCourtin theUnitedStates.SchneidermancitesRobertHowse'sobservationthat'thereisnodemocratic escape'fromtheinvestmentdisciplines(citedat191).Onemight,therefore,expectinvestment arbitrators to defer to domestic legislatures more frequently and extensively than would a domesticsupremecourt.Yettheoppositehasclearlyoccurredinmanytreatyawards.Forthis 8CLPERESEARCHPAPERSERIES[VOL. 06NO.04 reason,Schneidermansuggests,'thewholeedificeofinvestmentrulesseems…outofbalance' (231). A further irony -and one that has emerged very lately -is that the emerging crisis of neoliberalismcanbeseenasanindictmentoftheaggressiveapproachesofmanytribunals.Now thatneo-liberalreformsappeartohaveblownuptheUSfinancialsystemandunderminedthe globaleconomy,miringWesternstatesinmountainsofpublicdebt,itwillbeinterestingtosee whether arbitrators still have the temerity to sacrifice regulatory concerns in the interests of compensation for foreign investors. On the other hand, recent harrowing events in internationalfinancehavealsorevealedthatbyfarthegreatestthreatstosocialwelfarefrom neo-liberalideology-throughitsunbridlingofself-servingbehaviourinmarkets-stemfrom decisions of domestic governments, not those of international adjudicators. What stands out today is not regulatory chill created by investment treaties but the sheer anachronism of an arbitration system built as the institutional hammer of neo-liberalism and just now hitting its nailsatatimeofresurgentKeynesianismandrenewedregulation.Eventssincethepublication ofSchneiderman'sworkhavereaffirmedthatcorporateinvestmentandinternationalfinancial flows rest on foundations of state support. What else can one take from recent default nationalizationsoftheprivatesectorandsocializationofthecostofmarketrisksgonewrong? As Schneiderman foreshadows, state capitalism has returned with a vengeance to rescue nationaleconomiesfromfailedexperimentsinfinancialderegulation.Schneidermandescribes constitutional models of 'countries from the South' as envisaging 'a regime of constitutional rulesandstructuresthatfacilitatetheexerciseofgovernmentpowerthroughstatebuildingand national enterprise ' (158, 223-4) . But the description might be applied equally to the US and British constitutions, given their evident flexibility to allow the effective expropriation of (bankrupt) assets of major banks and firms so as to manage their restructuring and protect against repossession by foreign creditors. These events make the investment-rules regime's claimstodetachmentfrompoliticsandgovernmentlookallthemoredisingenuousornaïve. A major strength of Schneiderman's work is its examination of the rules regime in light of deeper controversies about the role of government in the economy. On the other hand, the book'scoreclaimof'constitutionalization'posesaproblem.Schneidermandoesnotgosofar astosaythatinvestmenttreatiesestablishasystemthatisakintodomesticconstitutions.Heis morecircumspect:theregimeis'constitution-like'initslegalrestraintofgovernmentsinways that are difficult to alter (4, 180). The system 'resembles the structure' of a domestic bill of rights; it 'replicates patterns' of US constitutional protections (223). More strongly, Schneiderman claims that the regime 'can be understood as an emerging form of supraconstitution that can supersede domestic constitutional norms' (3). Even in its more modestversion,however,Schneiderman'scasefor'constitutionalization'isopentodoubt. In the first place, Schneiderman does not elaborate what it means for a treaty system to resemble a constitutional structure or replicate constitutional patterns. All treaties put constraintsofvaryingsortsonstates.Dotheyallresembleorreplicatedomesticconstitutions? Or does resemblance come about only when the treaty regime obtains a particular level or formofobligationorenforcement?Whatisthethresholdforresemblance,asopposedtomere likeness, between a treaty system of international review and a constitutional structure? Should an assessment of whether the line is crossed focus on the breadth or intensity of the legal disciplines, or on the duration of a state's obligations, or on the use of adjudication to review conduct and enforce obligations? The adjudicative structure of investment treaties is, indeed, exceptional from an international perspective, just as its reliance on state liability to discipline legislative activity is extraordinary from a domestic viewpoint. But this says more about the form of constitutionalism that is advanced than about a distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional constraint. One could respond that the system's constitutional significance lies rather in its implications -given, especially, the examples of regulatorychillandpolicyconflictthatSchneidermandocuments-buthereagain,itisdifficult to see how investment treaties have impacts beyond those of other international regimes. Investment treaties are difficult to amend, for reasons of interstate relations or investor boycottmorethanofdomesticpolitics,butsotooweretheunequaltreatiesofthenineteenth andearlytwentiethcenturies.Andyettheunequaltreatieswereallabrogatedoramendedin time.
The invocation of national constitutions to frame the investment-rules regime risks elevating investment treaties beyond their actual significance. Both politically and economically, the investment-rules regime facilitates and directs solidarity among capital-exporting states and majorinvestorswhileisolatingcapital-importers.Butstatescanabrogatethetreaties.Theycan breachtheirobligationsandrefusetopayawards.Thecancondemnthearbitrationprocessas unfair.Theycanretaliateinvariouswaysagainstforeigninvestorswhobringclaims.Whatthey cannot do is prevent the arbitrators from convening themselves as tribunals or stop other statesfromrecognizingandenforcingtheawards.Butevenso,statescanrespondbyremoving their assets from arbitration-friendly jurisdictions while questioning the system's legitimacy overall. In short, they can approach the regime simply as one institutional feature of internationalpolitics,nomoreentitledtolegitimacythananyothersuchfeature,whetherthe United Nations Security Council, the International Monetary Fund, or the World Trade Organization. A core weakness of the constitutionalization rubric, used in many settings of internationaleconomiclaw,isitsignoringoftheroleofconstituentauthorityintheformation of constitutions. The label is applied to international decision-making processes, usually in an effort to piggyback on the legitimacy of domestic courts and constitutions, although these internationalprocessesare'constitutional'onlyintheverymechanicalsenseofanadjudicative process followed by final decision. Schneiderman comments that 'we should not understand the rules and structures of economic globalization as the project of some immanent and idealized transnational consensus' (44); and, as he shows convincingly, the investment-rules regimeisbutoneversionofconstitutionalismamongmanyalternatives.Sowhytellpeoplethat theirgovernmentsareboundconstitutionallywhen,infact,theyarenot? The claim that a regime is constitutionalized also seems misplaced where the adjudicative arrangement itself lacks integral components of a liberal constitutional structure, including 10CLPERESEARCHPAPERSERIES[VOL. 06NO.04 institutional safeguards of judicial independence and ongoing opportunities for judiciallegislativeinteraction.Investmentarbitrationdoesnotevensatisfythemodestinstitutionalized safeguards for judicial independence that are adopted at international courts. It is more appropriatelyregardedasanadjudicativearmofinternationalexecutiveagenciesattheWorld Bank, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and private arbitration centres or chambers of commerce. Thus, even if we limit our understanding of constitutionalism to its juridified and court-centred manifestations, as elaborated, for example, by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers (cited at 10), the investment-rules regime departs fundamentally from the constitutionalistmodelsofWesternliberaldemocracy. Schneiderman makes a powerful case that the investment-rules regime 'has as its object the placingoflegallimitsontheauthorityofgovernment,isolatingeconomicfrompoliticalpower, andassigningtoinvestmentintereststhehighestpossibleprotection'(4).Theregime'freezes existingdistributionsofwealthandprivileges"statusquoneutrality"'(37).Butdoesthismake theregimeconstitutionalorsimplyneo-liberal?Perhapstheunderlyingargumentisthelatter. Theneo-liberalprojectdrawson,orseekstoco-opt,constitutionalisttraditions,butithasno monopoly over the use of law and adjudication to enable markets or restrain states (or vice versa). Schneiderman suggests as much in chapter 8 through his discussion of the enabling notionofthe'socialruleoflaw'(207),althoughhedownplaystheviabilityofruleoflaw-based conceptualalternatives.Moreimportant,however,isthepointthattheregimeappearsnotto involve constitutionalization at all but rather the assertion of one brand of legal constitutionalismthroughthevehicleofinvestmentarbitration. Inthreeveryinsightfulchaptersattheendofthebook,Schneidermanpresentsvariousideas foralternativevisionsandresistance.Inchapter7,heexamineshowtheregimeconceivesof citizenshipinaglobaleconomy.Heflagsthecontradictionbetweentheregime'saimsoffixity and predictability for investors, on the one hand, and the wider themes of dislocation and insecurity that are associated with globalization for other actors (185). This leads to Schneiderman'sdiagnosisthatthesystemisbasedon'aversionofcitizenshipwithidentifiable rightsandmembershipinaparticularandprivilegedcommunity'(187)andonamythologyof the global entrepreneur as the pre-eminent world citizen (188-9). His alternative to this privileging of investors is to reinvigorate an enabling vision of constitutionalism in which 'constitutionaldesign institutionalizesdeliberativemodelsthat,it ishoped,willresultin both fairplayandimpartialpublicpolicy'(11).SchneidermandrawsonKarlPolanyi'snotionofthe 'doublemovement,'(citedat76)whichSchneidermandescribesas'theabilityofsocietytotake self-protectivemeasureswithregardtoland,labour,andmoney'(185-6).'Itisthiscapacityfor self-protection,' he argues, 'that is under threat by the constitution-like features of the investment-rules regime' (186); indeed, its removal 'may be catastrophic for many people in theworld'(225).SchneidermanrecallsthecommonwealthperiodofUSconstitutionalismprior totheCivilWar,inwhich'itwasconsideredareasonable-investmentbackedexpectationthat property rights would be limited by the state or its delegates in the interests of national development'(225-6).Property'wasvaluedforits"dynamic"ratherthanits"static"features: property "in motion or at risk" was valued over property merely secure or at rest'; likewise, propertylaw'hadlesstodowithprotectingintereststhanwithpromotingventures'(226).In thisway,saysSchneiderman, Thelawperformedanenablingfunction,generatingaframeworkforactionandthereleaseof privateenergies.Ratherthanlimitingstatecapacity,theobjectofconstitutionalandstatutory lawwasto'keepopenthechannelsofchange'andtoenlargethe'practicalrangeofoptionsin thefaceoflimitingcircumstance'…(228) Idoubtthatmanyoftheseideaswillreassureforeigninvestorswhohavemajorassetssunkin countrieswithweakjudicialinstitutions.Attheirbest,forSchneiderman,theinvestmentrules are 'a prophylactic to ethnic and race conflict' (230), but, absent cases of ethnic or racial targeting,investorsshouldlooktodomesticavenuesforredressandtoinvestmentinsuranceto protectagainstabuse(231-4).Resortshouldbehadtoanti-discriminationlawsandprocedural (butnotsubstantive)rightstoparticipateindecisionmaking(237).Whataboutcaseswherethe mistreatmentofaforeigninvestorisignoredbyadomesticcourtortribunalorisoutsidethe scopeofaninsurancepolicy?Schneidermandoesnotaddressthisdirectly.Theindirectanswer isthattheaimisnotultimatelytoprotectinvestorsatallcostsbutto'restoretheequilibrium between the economy and democracy ' (235) . This is a powerful answer in a time of climate change, global epidemics, and financial instability. As Schneiderman argues, 'an openness to change,oneofthegreatvirtuesofdemocraticsociety…morethaneverisafeatureworthyof preservationinthisageofeconomicglobalization'(236). Schneidermanconcludesalsobyemphasizingtheroleofnationalgovernments.Heissceptical ofattemptstoreassertsub-nationalcitizenshipasabasisforeffectiveresponsestoeconomic globalization,sincesub-nationalentitiesarelessablethannationalgovernmentstorespondto transnational actors and nonetheless bound by the very same investment disciplines (195) . More important is their role as 'discursive sites with which to explore political alternatives ' (196) . Schneiderman also cautions against grand but unproven aspirations for transnational governance; 'the difficulties of achieving the requisite cosmopolitan consciousness and then securingdemocraticallylegitimatetransnational-legalformsforcitizenparticipationcannotbe understated'(8).Forallthetalkofconstitutions,then,theclearestavenueforlegalresponses liesinstaterenegotiationorabrogationoftherulesregime.'States…havethecapacitytoundo that which is being done' (204) and they should pull back from 'binding pre-commitment strategies' that 'seem out of proportion … to the actual objectives of securing increased FDI' (225).Thisisarealisticassessment,notjustofthesystem,butofitsapparentlyconstitutional features.Onewhoopposesthisnoveladjudicativeregimeinfavourofestablishedframeworks for democratic choice and regulatory innovation should work towards getting responsible governmentofficialstoamendorannulthetreaties(orcontracts)ortoconcludenewtreaties that establish a more acceptable arrangement for review. This is may be a somewhat banal conclusionforadiscussionabouttheconstitutionalizationofeconomicglobalization,butitisa verysensibleone.
